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Abstract 
 
We present a general model of the interaction between settlement and the emergence 
of  de facto property rights on frontiers prior to governments establishing and 
enforcing  de jure property rights. Settlers have an incentive to establish de facto 
property rights to avoid the dissipation associated with open access conditions. The 
potential rent associated with more exclusivity drives the “demand’ for commons 
arrangements. As the potential rental stream from land increases due to enhanced 
scarcity there is a greater demand for more exclusivity beyond what can be sustained 
with commons arrangements. In some instances claimants will petition the 
government for de jure property rights to their claims – formal titles. In other 
instances it may be cheaper to acquire titles through fraudulent means. To the extent 
that governments supply property rights to those with first possession, land conflict 
will generally be minimal, though there may be political protests. But, governments 
face differing political constituencies and may not allocate de jure rights to the current 
claimants.  Moreover, governments may assign de jure rights but not be willing to 
enforce the rights. This may generate potential or actual conflict over land depending 
on the violence potentials held by the de facto and de jure land claimants. We 
examine land settlement and land conflict on the frontiers of Australia, the U.S. and 
Brazil. We are particularly interested in examining the emergence, sustainability, and 
collapse of commons arrangements in specific historical contexts. Our analysis 
indicates that the emergence of demand driven de facto property rights arrangements 
was relatively peaceful in Australia and the U.S. where claimants had reasons to 
organize collectively. The settlement process in Brazil was more prone to conflict 
because agriculture required fewer collective activities and as a result claimants 
resorted to periodic violent self-enforcement. In all three cases the movement from de 
facto  to  de jure property rights led to potential or actual conflict because of 
insufficient government enforcement.  
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1870  2105  184287  3148  322592 
1871  2117  195043  5248  487256 
1872  3019  346585  9179  797176 
1873  4761  619386  8144  1063066 
1874  4844  693489  11071  1831698 
1875  4632  738523  7091  183520 
1876  3994  933713  6482  1040356 
1877  3578  715440  7017  1126492 
1878  3842  703902  9058  1915129 
1879  2625  468121  6688  1032214 





























1863  2449  16.90    
1864  1630  10.74    
1865  1166  18.61    
1866  1050  40.48    
1867  2022  13.01    
1868  1568  15.37    
1869  1584  26.89    
1870  2361  14.65    
1871  2105  18.19    
1872  2117  36.61    
1873  3019  48.33    
1874  4761  39.68  9578  0.02 
1875  4844  48.27  6320  0.16 
1876  4632  45.88  5785  1.33 
1877  3994  44.79  6240  3.56 
1878  3578  50.45  7524  3.62 
1879  3842  27.38  5726  4.96 
1880  2625  53.75  4036  8.77 
1881  2867  66.93  3110  2.38 
1882  4983  19.93  4383  1.32 





















1862  2449  1240  50.63  162  6.61 
1863  1630  996  61.10  178  10.92 
1864  1166  729  62.52  258  22.13 
1865  1050  645  61.43  250  23.81 
1866  2022  1298  64.19  629  31.11 
1867  1568  1020  65.05  244  15.56 
1868  1584  1031  65.09  207  13.07 
1869  2361  1510  63.96  245  10.38 
1870  2105  1331  63.23  209  9.93 
1871  2117  1279  60.42  221  10.44 
1872  3019  1829  60.58  741  24.54 
1873  4761  2777  58.33  1089  22.87 
1874  4844  2779  57.37  889  18.35 
1875  4632  2661  57.45  714  15.41 
1876  3994  2556  64.00  250  6.26 
1877  3578  2128  59.47  209  5.84 
1878  3842  2011  52.34  268  6.98 
1879  2625  1090  41.52  129  4.91 
1880  2867  354  12.35  43  1.50 
1881  4983  23  0.46  13  0.26 
1882  5158  3  0.06  11  0.21 
 
Source: Adapted from Morris and Ranken (1883) 
 